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Monetary Poiicy and Long-Term
Real interest Rates
For many years, the Federal Reserve has relied
on M2 as an indicator of current economic con-
ditions. Over the last few years, however, the
historical relation between M2 velocity and inter-
est rates has broken down, as velocity has risen
sharply while interest rates have fallen. This de-
velopment has made it difficult to interpret the
information in M2. For example, over the last few
years, M2 growth often has fallen below its target
range. Based on historical relations, the slow
growth in M2 would be a sign of serious weak-
ness in the economy. But in this case, although
the economy has not been strong, the weakness
in M2 mainly reflected the fact that M2 velocity
turned out to be higher than expected. In other
words, if historical relationships had held, the re-
centslowgrowth inM2would have impliedamuch
weaker economy than actually was observed.
Since it has become more difficult to interpret
movements in M2, a variety ofother indicators of
economic and financial conditions have been ex-
plored. For example, Chairman Greenspan has
suggested that real interest rates might be a use-
ful indicator of economic conditions. The Federal
Reserve System cannot peg real interest rates, be-
cause an attempt to do so would run the risk of
generating a cumulative inflationary or defla-
tionary process. But movements in real interest
rates might provide timely and useful information
about economic and financial conditions and
thus might provide a useful guidepost for mon-
etary policy makers.
To make this operational, we need to address
two sets of issues. The first set concerns how
to define a benchmark with which to compare
movements in real interest rates. That is, how do
we decide whether real rates are unusually high
or low? The second set concerns the measure-
mentof real interest rates. Trehan (1993) dis-
cusses these issues in terms of short-term real
interest rates. This Weekly Letter complements
his analysis by discussing these issues in terms of
long-term interest rates.
Defining a benchmark real interest rate
The first problem is to define a benchmark real
interest rate and to determine how and why it
varies over time. Chairman Greenspan defines
the benchmark real interest rate as the level that,
if sustained, would keep the economy at its pro-
ductive potential over time. This is conceptually
similar to Milton Friedman's (1968) natural rate of
unemployment, so I will refer to it as the "natu-
ral" real interest rate.
The natural real interest rate will vary over time,
because the economy is subject to non-monetary
shocks that affect its actual and potential output.
Furthermore, since it is difficult to track the var-
iation in the economy's productive potential, it
may also be difficult to track the natural real rate,
especially over short horizons.
To some extent, this difficulty can be mitigated
by tracking the long-term, rather than the short-
term, natural rate. Long-term real interest rates
can be decomposed into two parts. One is the
expected real return earned by rolling over short-
term bills, and the other is the expected excess
return earned by holding long-term bonds. The
first component is motivated by the Expectations
Hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates.
According to this theory, arbitrage between alter-
native long- and short-term financial investments
will ensure that the long-term rate will equal the
expected rollover return on short-term bills. How-
ever, empirical studies show that there are pre-
dictable excess returns on long-term bonds, and
this is often interpreted as a manifestation oftime-
varying risk, since arbitrage would also eliminate
risk-adjusted excess returns. Thus the second
component can be interpreted as a risk premium.
Both of these components are likely to be less
variable over longer holding periods than they
areovershortholdingperiods.Thefirstcomponent,
the rollover return, is equal to a weighted average
of expected future short rates, and the averaging
process smooths out much of the variation inFA8SF
short rates. Thus long-horizon rollover returns
ought to be less variable than short-horizon roll-
over returns. Similarly, the long-term risk premium
is a weighted aveiage of expected short-term ex-
cess holding returns. Again, because of the av-
eraging process, long-term premia ought to be
smoother than short-term excess returns. There-
fore the long-term natural rate is likely to be less
variable than the short-term natural rate.
One problem that remains to be solved is defin-
ing the natural risk premium. This is important
because much of the variation in long-term real
interest rates appears to be due to variation in
risk-premia (for example, see Cogley 1993). The
problem is that current models of the term struc-
ture do not generate empirically plausible risk
premia. Specifically, ifwe assume that financial
markets eliminate arbitrage opportunities, then
risk-adjusted excess returns should be unpre-
dictable. However, when confronted with data,
theoretical models ofthe term structure imply
that "risk-adjusted" excess returns are predict-
able, and this is generally interpreted as a sign
that the models do not correctly adjust for risk.
Without an adequate model of risk, it would be
difficult to know what is meant by the natural
level of the risk premium. The problem of mod-
eling risk premia remains an active area of
research.
Measuring long-term real interest rates
The market real rate of interest is equal to the
nominal interest rate minus the expected infla-
tion rate (this is sometimes call the ex ante rate).
Since market expectations of inflation are not
directly observable, the real interest rate also is
unobservable. Thus, real interest rates must be
estimated. There are several ways to do this, cor-
responding to different estimates of expected
inflation.
One approach is to substitute actual, realized in-
flation rates for expected inflation. This measure
is known as the ex post real interest rate. Since ex
post real interest rates are based on the actual in-
flation rate over the holding period, they cannot
be computed until the holding period has ended.
Thus ex post real interest rates on long-term
bonds are available only after long lags. For ex-
ample, the most recently available ex post 10
year real interest rate is theonefor November1983.
Since ex post real rates are not available on a
timely basis, they are not likely to be useful for
current policy analysis.
Furthermore, at the long end of the maturity spec-
trum, ex post real rates are not likely to match ex
ante real rates closely. The ex ante real interest
rate is equal to the ex post real rate plus the error
in forecasting inflation over the holding period.
Thus the ex post real rate can be regarded as the
sum of the true ex ante value plus a measure-
ment error. Since long-term inflation forecast
errors are highly correlated over time, there can
be persistent differences between ex ante and ex
post real interest rates. As a consequence, the
measurement error in ex post real interest rates
often obscures the true ex ante value, and this
makes it difficult to use long-term ex post rates
for historical analysis.
A second approach is to estimate expected infla-
tion using survey data on inflation forecasts. Var-
ious surveys of long-term inflation expectations
are available on a sporadic basis going back to
1979. For example, Figure 1 reports the 10-year
real interest rate based on the Hoey survey of
lO-year inflation expectations. Survey data have
three limitations. First, since respondents may
have little at stake when filling in the survey,
there is some concern that survey data may not
provide an accurate measure of inflation expec-
tations. Second, surveys of long-term inflation
forecasts go back only to the late 1970s. Since
this period covers only a few business cycles,
there may be too little data to learn much about
the cyclical properties of long-term real rates.
Third, the early surveys have missing obser-
vations, which greatly complicates statistical
analysis. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia has begun to collect a survey of long-run
inflation forecasts on a regular basis. While this
seems like a worthwhile long-run investment,
it may take a number of business cycles before
there are enough observations to use the data to
analyze the cyclical properties of long-term real
interest rates.
A third way to measure long-term real interest
rates is to estimate them using an econometric
model. For example, the model discussed in
Cogley (1993) can be used for this purpose. This
model estimates long-term real interest rates by
forecasting short-term real interest rates and
excess holding returns over long time horizons
and then discounting them back to the present.
The forecasting model includes lagged values
ofthe 3-month Treasury bill rate, the inflation
rate, the unemployment rate, and the ex post
excess holding return on 10-year Treasury bonds.
The model was estimated over the period 1968.Ql
to 1993.Q2, and ex ante forecasts were generated
by iterating through every quarter in the sample.
The resulting long-term real rate is shown by the
solid line in Figure 2. The shaded areas mark68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92
Figure 2: Econometric Estimates of
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Figure 1: Real10-Year Treasury Bond Yield
Derived From Hoey Survey of Inflation
Percent










the dates of recessions, as determined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research. The long-
term real rate appears to be countercyclical, al-
though it does not systematically lead or lag the
business cycle. For example, in the 1974-1975
recession, the real rate peaked near the trough of
the cycle, while in the 1981-1982 recession it
peaked shortly after the downturn.
For our purposes, it is important to try to quantify
the uncertainty about this measure of the long-
term real rate. This measure is based on estimates
of a forecasting model, and errors in estimating
the model will translate into errors in measuring
the long-term real rate. A Monte Carlo simulation
was conducted in order to quantify the degree
of uncertainty, and the results are shown by the
dotted lines in Figure 2. These mark the margin
of error associated with the estimated real rate.
Specifically, at any given date, there is a 5 per-
cent chance that the real interest rate could be
as high as the upper curve as well as a 5 percent
chance that it couId be as low as the lower curve.
In other words, the figure tells us that there is a
9 in 10 chance that the real rate lies somewhere
between the dotted lines. The average distance be-
tween the upper and lower margins of error is
roughly 6 percent; thus it is difficult to pin down
long-term real interest rates with a great deal of
precision.
it only accounts for uncertainty in the estimates
ofthe parameters ofthe forecasting model, not
for uncertainty about the ·model's specification.
Presumably, if this were taken into account, the
margin of error would be even larger.
Conclusion
Conceptually, it is difficult to define a natural
long-term real interest rate because we do not yet
have satisfactory models of risk. Empirically, it is
difficult to estimate long-term real interest rates
because there is a great deal of uncertainty about
long-horizon forecasts. Thus, while long-term
real interest rates may prove to be a useful indi-
cator of economic and financial conditions, we
need to confront a number of difficult issues in
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